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American state legislatures provide considerable institutional variation for testing 
theories of legislative representation, and one such feature is the multi-member district system 
(MMD).  Whereas the U.S. House and most American state legislatures use the single member 
district system (SMD) in which a single legislator represents one geographic district, several 
state legislatures still use a system in which more than one legislator is elected from the same 
district in the same election.  Although there can be considerable variation in the rules for such 
MMDs, one structure common to many state legislatures is a situation in which multiple 
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candidates run against each other for two seats from one district, and the two receiving the most 
votes are elected.  Clearly, the electoral game is quite different in a situation in which a candidate 
is likely to be running against not only members of other parties but also another candidate of the 
same party.  The incentives inherent in such a system are quite different than those for a 
legislator in an SMD, and it likely that such incentives change legislative representation in a 
number of ways.   
Legislative representation has many features, including symbolic, descriptive, and service 
aspects, but we are interested in how MMDs affect substantive representation as displayed 
through roll call votes on legislation.  In particular, in this paper we examine roll call voting 
behavior for Arizona state legislators from 1995 to 2002.  Arizona provides a natural experiment 
for the effect of MMDs because the House is MMD, the Senate is SMD, and the geographic lines 
for the districts are the same in both chambers.  For each district, two House members chosen in 
a free-for-all election represent the exact same geographic district as one senator elected via an 
SMD system.  If median voter theory holds across legislative institutions, then we would expect 
all three legislators to look very similar in their roll call voting patterns as each winning 
candidate sought the median voter position.  But if MMDs offer an incentive structure for 
candidates to use ideological branding to differentiate oneself from the opponents in the 
campaign, then all three legislators may be quite different from each other in terms of how they 
vote on roll calls.     
Formal models suggest that MMD legislators will move away from the median voter 
under certain conditions (Cox 1990), but there are few empirical examinations of how MMDs 
affect floor voting behavior in state legislatures (Adams 1996; Jewell 1982a, 1982b; Richardson, 
Russell, and Cooper 2004).  The empirical studies have largely relied on interest group ratings 
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and interviews as measures of ideology, and a few selected roll-call votes, but none has used 
large numbers of roll call data over several legislative sessions. We seek to test the hypothesis 
that MMDs influence legislative roll call behavior by generating W-NOMINATE scores with 
bootstrapped standard errors as ideal point estimates based on roll-call votes in four recent 
sessions of the Arizona legislature.  Employing a spatial model of purely preference-based 
voting, we test the impact of the electoral mechanism by examining 1) the congruence of 
preferences for legislators representing the same geographic district and constituents, and  2) 
differences in the distribution of preferences for the party caucuses in each chamber.   
Legislative Representation in Multi-Member Districts  
Multi-member district systems have long a history in the American states, and as Klain 
(1955, 1113) notes “for nearly a century after the Declaration of Independence the American 
states elected by far the greater part of their law-makers in multiple constituencies.”  The use of 
MMDs flourished in the first half of the twentieth century up until the Baker v. Carr decision.  In 
the 1950s, 36 state legislatures employed MMDs for 45 percent of the legislative seats (Klain 
1955), and in 1962 about 46 percent of legislators were elected from MMDs (Cox 1984).   
Because partisan or racial minorities could be outvoted by the majority in all races within an 
MMD even though they could have a large enough percent to win in an SMD carved from the 
larger MMD, states (either by legislative decision or court decision) began to move away from 
MMDs after Baker v. Carr.  The percent of legislators from MMDs nationwide had dropped to 
26 percent of all House representatives and 7.5 percent of senators by 1984 (Niemi, Hill, and 
Grofman 1985).  After the redistricting efforts caused by the 2000 census, fewer than 10 states 
used MMD systems with free-for-all elections involving multiple candidates.      
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Research on legislative representation in MMDs has tended to focus on descriptive 
representation issues much more than substantive representation.  In particular, the question of 
whether geographically concentrated racial minorities are disadvantaged by MMDs has been 
important both for scholars and for civil rights cases involving legislative redistricting plans.  
Generally, the consensus has been that MMDs diluted black voting strength such that fewer 
black legislators were elected to state legislatures, especially in southern states (Herrick and 
Welch 1989; Grofman, Migalski, and Noviello 1986; Moncrief and Thompson 1992).  On the 
other hand, some have argued against this finding (MacManus 1979), and Rule (1992) argues 
that MMDs may be bad for black male legislators but good for the number of black female 
legislators.  Further, research suggests that MMDs may increase the number of female legislators 
in state legislatures (Arceneaux 2001; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1985, 1987; Hogan 2001; King 
2002; Rule 1990), but there is some conflicting evidence (Welch and Studlar 1990).  Overall, the 
evidence suggests that MMDs may produce a different distribution of legislators, but much less 
work has been done on whether it has an impact on legislative decisions.    
Political parties drive the legislative agenda, and some attention has been devoted to the 
impact of MMDs on state legislative political caucuses.  If a minority group (in this case 
partisan) can be overwhelmed in all elections within an MMD, then it is possible that a group 
large enough to elect a representative within a specific SMD division of the district could be shut 
out of representation in the larger MMD.  Some scholars have suggested this to be the case over 
the years (Walker 1976; Rosenthal 1981, 15), but Niemi, Hill, and Grofman (1985) provide 
evidence that minority party strength is not diluted by MMDs.  They show evidence that MMD 
chambers are not statistically different than SMDs on several measures, including representation 
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of the minority party in districts, the percent of seats split between parties, and minority 
representation after a switch from MMD to SMD. 
If legislative party representation as measured in terms of a quantity is not affected 
significantly by MMDs, then is it possible that parties are different in some qualitative way 
because of MMDs?   To address this issue, Adams (1996) uses formal logic to argue that MMDs 
do not provide the same incentive to converge on the median voter as SMDs (Downs 1957; 
Duverger 1953; Hotelling 1929), and that in all but the rarest of cases MMDs “should increase 
the ideological variance across a party’s pool of nominees” (137).  Using interest group scores in 
Illinois before and after a switch from MMD to SMD, Adams finds evidence that the parties 
were more ideologically diverse during the years with the MMD system.  This finding is 
suggestive, but it uses only one interest group score as a measure of legislator preferences, it 
does not focus on individual legislators, and the Illinois legislature used a cumulative MMD 
system, which was unique at the time and not used in any state since 1982. 
The Illinois cumulative MMD is but one type of MMD employed in the states over the 
years.  The major variations include Bloc, Bloc with Partial Abstention, Cumulative, Staggered, 
and Seat, but even within these different types the magnitude (or number of seats in a district) 
can vary across states and even within a state.   The Bloc system uses a free-for-all election in 
which multiple candidates compete simultaneously for two or more seats, and the candidates 
with the most votes win the seats.  In the Bloc system, voters have to use both of their votes on 
different candidates, but one variation is the Bloc with partial abstention in which voters can 
choose to cast only one vote.  For example, in the Arizona system two seats are available in each 
district, and as many as two Democrats, two Libertarians, two Greens, and two Republicans 
could vie for the two available seats that go to the two candidates with the most votes.  In a tight 
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four-candidate race, the winning candidates may have as little as 26% of the votes cast in the 
election.   
The cumulative system allows a voter to use all of the votes allowed for one candidate or 
split the votes among multiple candidates.  Cox (1990b) argues that cumulative systems offer 
very different strategic considerations for candidates than bloc MMDs.  The staggered election, 
exemplified by the U.S. Senate, involves two or more candidates representing the same 
geographic district but elected in separate elections at different times.  Finally, the seat or post 
type of MMD involves an election in which two or more separate races are conducted in the 
same geographic district at the same time, but candidates must designate which seat (say A or B) 
they are contesting and voters can only choose candidates from within each designated seat list.  
Scholars have argued that these last two types (staggered and seat) are not true MMDs because 
they basically serve as SMDs occurring in the same geographic district (Cox 1984; Hamm and 
Moncrief 1999: 148; Niemi, Jackman and Winsky 1991: 97), but are often mistakenly used in 
analyses of MMD effects.  For this particular study, our reference to the MMD system is the bloc 
with partial abstention form used in the Arizona House.   
The vast majority of studies examining the spatial theory of elections have focused on 
SMD systems, but the less numerous studies of MMD systems provide ample evidence that most 
MMD variations provide incentives for candidates to move away from the median voter.  Using 
a variety of assumptions about rules, the number of competitors, and voters, several studies have 
shown equilibria located away from the media voter (Eaton and Lipsey 1975; Denzau, Kats, and 
Slutsky 1985; Greenberg and Shepsle 1987).  In the most comprehensive examination of MMD 
rule scenarios, Cox (1990a, 1990b) uses the ideas of centripetal (centrist-directed) and 
centrifugal (extremism away from the center) forces to characterize the incentives inherent in 
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various electoral systems.  Using a standard spatial model with a single left-right ideological 
dimension, single-peaked preferences, and sincere voting, bloc with partial abstention provide 
centrifugal forces away from the median voter with as few as 3 candidates in a two-seat MMD 
(917), and more candidates should lead to more dispersion away from the median.   
The hypothesis that MMDs lead to more extreme legislators in a chamber has not 
received much empirical verification.   Much of the work has been in the comparative context 
with various MMD arrangements, institutional rules and political cultures that may or may not 
apply to American state legislatures.  Cox (1997) tested his spatial models with case studies from 
several countries with various forms of MMDs, and he found evidence supporting the idea of 
MMDs producing more extreme legislators.  Similarly, in two studies of Chilean MMDs, Dow 
(1998) and Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuels (1998) also find confirming evidence of the 
extremism hypothesis.  In the American context, Schiller examined the U.S. Senate (a staggered 
MMD rather than a bloc MMD), and she finds evidence that “a combination of electoral 
incentives and institutional forces … push senators [from the same state] in contrasting 
directions” (Schiller 2000, 4).    
The hypothesis has received less attention in the literature on American state politics.  
Richardson, Russell, and Cooper (2004) test for ideological extremism in the Arizona State 
Legislature, and they also find confirming evidence of ideological extremism hypothesis.  Using 
a scale of interest group endorsements as a measure of legislator preferences, they compare the 
distribution of preferences in the MMD House and SMD Senate, the differences between 
legislators within the same geographic districts, and the distributions across party caucuses.  In 
addition, they use logistic regression analysis to explain the differences in ideological 
preferences, and find that the MMD system is significant in explaining this extremism.   Finally, 
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they argue that ideology is significant in explaining votes in the MMD House but not the SMD 
Senate.   
The evidence in the comparative context and this single test in a state legislature are 
suggestive, but to adequately test the spatial models predicting centripetal aspects of MMDs we 
need better measures of legislator ideal points than just interest group endorsements.  The 
hundreds of roll-call votes in each legislative session offer a wealth of information on revealed 
legislator preferences, and single or two-dimensional space estimates can be obtained to test the 
hypotheses.  In the next section we describe our use of W-NOMINATE to estimate legislator 
ideal points revealed in roll call data for Arizona in the 42nd to 45th legislative sessions.      
Estimating Legislator Ideal Points 
Our study draws roll-call data from the 42nd through 45th Arizona legislatures, which is 
publicly available on the internet.  An important issue for producing scale comparable ideal 
points is the “bridging” of observations across chambers (e.g., Poole 2004, ch. 6; Bailey and 
Chang 2001; Bailey 2001).  Our hypotheses require ideal point estimates that are comparable for 
both members of the house and senate.  To bridge the chambers, we chose roll-call votes in the 
following way.  According to Arizona’s parliamentary procedure, a bill that originates in the 
senate goes to the house for an initial vote (before amendments) after a final vote in the senate.  
Thus, the final vote in the senate and the initial vote in the house are on identical language.  We 
treat both votes as a single roll-call, and thus bridge all observations in our dataset.  Our 
estimates are made by performing the procedure described below on one roll-call matrix for each 
session (year) in which the legislature met between 1995 and 2002, with the exception of the 
second session of the 43rd legislature (1998).2 
                                                 
2 The data for this session were inexplicably corrupted.  We are resigned to including an analysis of this session in 
the next version of our paper. 
  9
 
For single-session ideal points, we use W-NOMINATE and generate bootstrapped 
standard errors for our estimates (Lewis and Poole 2004).  The process begins by running the W-
NOMINATE routine until it converges.  Then, the probabilities for the observed roll-call votes 
are calculated, and a matrix with legislators as rows and roll-call votes as columns is created, 
with the cells containing the probabilities of each observed vote choice.  A random draw of roll-
calls is then created by (a) drawing from a U(0,1) distribution, (b) recording the sampled value as 
the “observed” choice if the random draw is less than or equal to the probability calculated 
subsequent to the W-NOMINATE run, or (c) recording the opposite of the sampled value as the 
“observed” choice if the random draw is greater than the probability calculated.  This generates a 
sampling roll-call matrix, on which W-NOMINATE is run.  One hundred random draws and W-
NOMINATE runs on the sampling matrices are performed, and variances are calculated from 
these bootstrap trials.  If the fit of W-NOMINATE is poor, the bootstrapped variances will be 
large (Lewis and Poole 2004, 109).   
The W-NOMINATE program identifies Kenneth Cheuvront (D-25th District) as “left” 
(liberal) on dimension one and Susan Gerard (R-18th District) “up” on dimension two, 
constraining the scale to the unit circle.  Using interest group scores and media accounts, we 
have selected Cheuvront as consistently liberal.  Gerard is known as the leader of the “Sue 
Nation,” which later sprouted into the “Mushroom Coalition,” a group of moderate Republicans 
who broke party ranks on a variety of votes during this period. 
As a simple check on the face validity of the ideal points, we compared the first 
dimension scores to a variety of interest group scores across the years.  The results for two 
different years and interest groups are reported in Figures 1 and 2, and they are representative of 
other years.  In Figure 1, the Dimension 1 Ideal Points are arrayed from a negative one value on 
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the left to a positive one value on the right, with a liberal pegged as the negative value.  The 
NFIB scores are generally viewed as ranging from liberal at the low end to more conservative (or 
pro-business) at the higher end.  Therefore, we would expect an upward sloping distribution of 
ideal points, and table 1 shows this to be true.  In Figure 2, the League of Conservation Voters 
code votes so that a high value is a pro-environment or more liberal score so we would expect a 
downward sloping pattern, and this is what the plot shows.  Generally, these figures offer some 
face validity to the measure of ideal points and our interpretation of their values.   
   
Testing the Impact of MMD on Legislator Ideal Points 
 To test the hypothesis that the MMD electoral mechanism leads to more extremity in 
legislators, we examine both state- and district-level measures of extremity.  Beginning with the 
more aggregate analysis, we can state the hypothesis as follows: 
H1:  The ideal point for the median member of the MMD House for a given party 
should be larger, in absolute terms, than the ideal point for the median member of 
the SMD Senate. 
In other words, the Democratic Senate median should be less negative than the Democratic 
House median, and vice versa for the Republican Party. 
Table 1 presents our first dimension W-NOMINATE estimates for all sessions in the 
sample.  It is readily apparent that the among Democratic chamber medians, the MMD House 
median is more liberal than the Senate median in every year except 1995.  These differences are 
statistically significant in 1997 and 1999.  This pattern is also true for Republicans except in the 
45th legislature (2001-2002).3  Nonetheless, this distinction is only statistically significant in 
                                                 
3 Republicans are in the majority in both chambers for all years in the sample, though that majority vanishes in the 
45th Senate, where each party is represented by fifteen members.   
  11
 
2000.  Table 2 presents second dimension W-NOMINATE estimates, which have a less clear 
interpretation because they measure the degree of agreement with Sue Gerard and the Mushroom 
Coalition.4 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]   
Our aggregate measures lend some support to the extremism hypothesis, but they do not 
speak to activity within the districts.  To examine this, we construct three measures of extremism 
among legislators representing the same geographic constituency:  
(a) absolute spatial distance between representatives: |H1 – H2|,  
(b) average absolute spatial distance between the senator and each representative 
mean{|S – H|}, and  
(c) maximum absolute distance between the senator and extreme representative, max{|S - 
H1|,|S - H2|} 
We can state the district-level hypotheses as follows: 
H2 (Centripetal Force): |H1 – H2| should be nonzero. 
H3 (Extremism): Both |S – H1| and |S - H2| should be nonzero, and max{|S - 
H1|,|S - H2|} should be large. 
Values for each of these measures are presented in Table 3.  One can quickly see that 
unlike the aggregate measures, these district-level statistics strongly suggest a pattern of 
extremism.  The House members representing the exact same geographic constituency assume 
very different positions in the policy space measured by dimension 1.  In addition, the average 
difference between House members and the Senator from the same district are also quite large.  
Further, the maximum distance from a House member to a Senator from the same district is on 
average quite large too, and this difference often exceeds even the House differences.  Finally, 
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the standard errors of the estimates in the final column are much smaller than any of the 
legislator differences so this provides some context for interpretation of these spatial distances in 
ideal points for the legislators.   
Conclusion 
 Though there have been important implications of spatial models regarding the effect of 
MMD versus SMD electoral mechanisms on legislator ideology, there have been few attempts to 
examine these effects in large-N studies using roll-call data.  This paper presents a preliminary 
examination of the MMD extremism hypothesis using a new dataset of chamber comparable 
ideal point estimates for members of the Arizona legislature from 1995-2002.  We find sparse 
evidence that MMD and SMD effects are cognizable in the aggregate legislature, but that the 
effects of these electoral mechanisms within districts is strong and consistent.  Multi-Member 
Districts in the Arizona house produce more ideologically extreme representation than their 
single-member senate counterparts.    
 
  13
 
References 
Adams, Greg D.  1996.  “Legislative Effects of Single-Member vs. Multi-Member Districts.”  
American Journal of Political Science 40: 129-44.   
 
Arceneaux, Kevin.  2001.  “The ‘Gender Gap’ In State Legislative Representation: New Data to 
Tackle an Old Question.”  Political Research Quarterly 54: 143-60.   
 
Bailey, Michael and Kelly H. Chang. 2001. “Comparing Presidents, Senators, and  
Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation.” Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 17:477-506. 
 
Cox, Gary W.  1984.  “Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts: Approval Voting 
in Practice.”  American Journal of Political Science 28: 722-738.   
 
Cox, Gary W.  1990a.  “Multicandidate Spatial Competition.” In  Advances in the Spatial Theory 
of Voting, ed. J. M. Enelow and M. J. Hinich.  New York: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Cox, Gary W.  1990b.  “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems.”  American 
Journal of Political Science 34: 903-35.   
 
Cox, Gary W.  1997.  Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral 
Systems.  New York: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Darcy, Robert, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark.  1985.  “Women Candidates in Single-and Multi-
Member Districts.”  Social Science Quarterly 66: 945-53.   
 
Darcy, Robert, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark.  1987.  Women, Elections, and Representation.  
New York: Longman.   
 
Denzau, Arthur, Amoz Kats, and Steven Slutsky.  1985.  “Multi-Agent Equilibria with Market 
Share and Ranking Objectives.” Social Choice and Welfare 2: 37-50.   
 
Dow, Jay K.  1998.  “A Spatial Analysis of Candidates in Dual Member Districts: The 1989 
Chilean Senatorial Elections.”  Public Choice 97: 119-42.   
 
Downs, Anthony.  1957.  An Economic Theory of Democracy.  New York: Harper & Row.   
 
Duverger, Maurice.  1955.  The Political Role of Women.  Paris: The United Nations Economic 
and Social Council.   
 
Eaton, B. B. and Richard Lipsey.  1975.  “The Principal of Minimum Differentiation 
Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition.”  Review 
of Economic Studies 42: 27-50.   
 
Greenberg, Joseph, and Kenneth A. Shepsle.  1987.  “The Effects of Electoral Rewards in 
Multiparty Competition with Entry.”  American Political Science Review 81:525-538.   
  14
 
 
Grofman, Bernard, and Michael Migalski, and Nicholas Nociello.  1986.  “Effects of 
Multimember Districts on Black Representation in State Legislatures.”  Review of Black 
Political Economy 14: 65-78.  
 
Hamm, Keith E., and Gary F. Moncrief.  1999.  “Legislative Politics in the States.”  In Virginia 
Gray, Russell L. Hanson, and Herbert Jacob, eds.  Politics in the American States: A 
Comparative Analysis, Seventh Edition.  Washington DC: CQ Press.   
 
Herrick, Rebekah, and Susan Welch.  1992.  “The Impact of At-Large Elections on the 
Representation of Black and White Women.”  National Political Science Review 3: 62-
77.   
 
Hogan, Robert E.  2001.  “The Influence of State and District Conditions on the Representation 
of Women in State Legislatures.”  American Politics Research 29: 4-24.   
 
Hotelling, Harold.  1929.  “Stability in Competition.”  Economic Journal 39:41-57.  
 
Jewell, Malcolm E.  1982a.  Representation in State Legislatures.  Lexington, KY: University of 
Kentucky Press. 
 
Jewell, Malcolm.  1982b. “The Consequences of Single- and Multi-Member Districts.”  In B. 
Grofman, A. Lijphart, R. McKay and H. Scarrow, eds.  Representation and Redistricting 
Issues, Lexington, MA: DC Heath.   
 
King, James D.  2002.  “Single-Member Districts and the Representation of Women in American 
State Legislatures: The Effects of Electoral System Change.”  State Politics and Policy 
Quarterly 2: 161-75.   
 
Klain, Maurice.  1955.  “A New Look at the Constituencies: The Need for a Recount and a 
Reappraisal.”  American Political Science Review 49: 1105-19.   
 
Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Keith T. Poole. 2004. "Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in Ideal Point 
Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap." Political Analysis 12:105-127. 
 
MacManus, Susan.  1979.   
 
Magar, Eric, Marc R. Rosenblum, and David Samuels.  “On the Absence of Centripetal 
Incentives in Double-Member Districts.”  Comparative Political Studies 31: 714-39.    
 
Moncrief, Gary F. and Joel A. Thompson.  1992.  “Electoral Structure and State Legislative 
Representation: A Research Note.”  Journal of Politics 54(1): 246-56.   
 
Moncrief, Gary F., Joel A. Thompson, and William Cassie.  1996.  “Revisiting the State of U.S. 
State Legislative Research.”  Legislative Studies Quarterly 21: 301-35.   
 
  15
 
Niemi, Richard, Jeffrey Hill, and Bernard Grofman.  1985.  “The Impact of Multimember 
Districts on Party Representation in U.S. State Legislatures.”  Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 10: 441-55.   
 
Niemi, Richard, Simon Jackman, and Laura Winski.  1991.  “Candidacies and Competitiveness 
in Multimember Districts.”  Legislative Studies Quarterly 16: 91-109.   
 
Niemi, Richard, and Laura Winski.  1987.  “Membership Turnover in U.S. State Legislatures” 
Trends and Effects of Districting.”  Legislative Studies Quarterly 12:115-23.   
 
Richardson, Lilliard E., Brian E. Russell, and Christopher A. Cooper.  2004. “Legislative 
Representation in a Single-Member versus Multiple-Member District System: The 
Arizona State Legislature.”  Political Research Quarterly 57:337-344.  .   
 
Rosenthal, Alan.  1991.  Legislative Life: People, Process, and Performance in the States.  New 
York: Harper & Row.   
 
Rule, Wilma.  1990.  “Why More Women Are State Legislators: A Research Note.”  Western 
Political Quarterly 43: 437-48.   
 
Rule, Wilma.  1992.  “Multimember Legislative Districts: Minority and Anglo Women’s and 
Men’s Recruitment Opportunity.”  In Wilma Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman, eds.  
United States Electoral Systems: Their Impact on Women and Minorities.  New York: 
Greenwood Press.   
 
Schiller, Wendy J.  2000.  Partners and Rivals: Representation in U.S. Senate Delegations.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press.     
 
Walker, Roland E.  1976.  “One man-One Vote: In Pursuit of an Elusive Ideal.”  Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly 3: 453-484.   
 
Welch, Susan, and Donley T. Studlar.  1990.  “Multi-Member Districts and the Representation of 
Women: Evidence From Britain and the United States.”  Journal of Politics 52: 391-412. 
 
 
 
  16
 
Table 1: Comparison of the First Dimension Ideal Points and the Ratings from the National 
Federation for Independent Business in the 44th Arizona Legislature  
Dimension 1 and the NFIB scores, AZ 44th, First Session 
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Table 2: Comparison of the First Dimension Ideal Points and the Ratings from the Arizona 
League of Conservation Voters in the 45th Arizona Legislature 
Dimension 1 and League of Conservation Voter Scores, AZ 45th First Session
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Table 1: First Dimension W-NOMINATE Estimates with Lewis-Poole Standard Errors for Chamber and Party Median 
Legislators, 42nd – 45th Arizona Legislatures* 
  
 
Session 
 
Democratic 
Median 
 
Republican 
Median 
 
House Democratic 
Median 
 
Senate Democratic 
Median 
 
House Republican 
Median 
 
Senate Republican 
Median 
 
42nd , 1st Sess. 
(1995) 
 
Armistead (23rd) 
-.716 
(.103) 
 
Turner (15th) 
.441 
(.112) 
 
McClendon (5th) 
-.706 
(.116) 
 
Peña (22nd) 
-.751 
(.137) 
 
Gardner (27th) 
.509 
(.116) 
 
Spitzer (18th) 
.393 
(.115) 
42nd, 2nd Sess. 
(1996) 
    Nichols (13th) 
-.723 
(.134) 
Kaites (16th) 
.168 
(.148) 
Nichols (13th) 
-.723 
(.134) 
Cummiskey (25th) 
-.669 
(.127) 
Wong (18th) 
.224 
(.157) 
G. Richardson (29th) 
.149 
(.150) 
43rd, 1st Sess. 
(1997) 
Cheuvront (25th) 
-.393 
(.238) 
Leff (24th) 
.183 
(.206) 
Nichols (8th) 
-.509 
(.203) 
J. Lopez (22nd) 
-.208 
(.220) 
Allen (28th) 
.202 
(.275) 
Bee (9th) 
.086 
(.217) 
44th, 1st Sess. 
(1999) 
Mitchell (27th) 
-.589 
(.166) 
May (26th) 
.486 
(.175) 
Landrum (23rd) 
-.733 
(.202) 
P. Rios (7th) 
-.552 
(.194) 
Griffin (8th) 
.526 
(.167) 
Freestone (30th) 
.243 
(.247) 
44th, 2nd Sess. 
(2000) 
Horton (14th) 
-.655 
(.104) 
Huppenthal (6th) 
.383 
(.129) 
Nichols (13th) 
-.709 
(.110) 
Cunningham (13th) 
-.287 
(.136) 
Griffin (8th) 
.539 
(.118) 
Freestone (30th) 
.050 
(.142) 
45th, 1st Sess. 
(2001) 
Chase (7th) 
-.664 
(.14) 
Daniels (6th) 
.192 
(.148) 
Pickens (14th) 
-.771 
(.139) 
J. Lopez (22nd) 
-.588 
(.138) 
Gray (16th) 
.160 
(.146) 
Bee (9th) 
.211 
(.128) 
45th, 2nd Sess. 
(2002) 
Giffords (13th) 
-.732 
(.117) 
Leff (24th) 
-.070 
(.153) 
 
Lugo (8th) 
-.735 
(.120) 
Mitchell (27th) 
-.698 
(.160) 
Weiers (16th) 
.133 
(.158) 
 
Petersen (29th) 
-.305 
(.128) 
*Note: The ideal point estimates in this table are the means of 1000 bootstrap Trials.  Standard Errors appear in parentheses. These ideal point estimates are not 
comparable across sessions.  However, they are comparable across chambers in a single session.  Where a relevant subset of legislators is an even number, the 
median presented is the ideal point estimate for the senator in position (max – min) / 2.  Legislators are listed with their district immediately following in 
parentheses. 
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Table 2: Second Dimension W-NOMINATE Estimates with Lewis-Poole Standard Errors for Chamber and Party Median 
Legislators, 42nd – 45th Arizona Legislatures* 
  
 
Session 
 
Democratic 
Median 
 
Republican 
Median 
 
House Democratic 
Median 
 
Senate Democratic 
Median 
 
House Republican 
Median 
 
Senate Republican 
Median 
 
42nd , 1st Sess. 
(1995) 
 
Hubbard (10th) 
-.281 
(.158) 
 
Turner (24th) 
.172 
(.194) 
 
Horton (14th) 
-.344 
(.159) 
 
Soltero (22nd) 
.336 
(.200) 
 
Lynch (1st) 
-.106 
(.177) 
 
Wettaw (2nd) 
.527 
(.216) 
42nd, 2nd Sess. 
(1996) 
    Jackson (3rd) 
-.007 
(.223) 
Preble (9th) 
.160 
(.241) 
E. Richardson (11th) 
-.764 
(.142) 
Henderson (3rd) 
-.392 
(.172) 
Allen (28th) 
-.171 
(.205) 
Barnes (21st) 
.542 
(.300) 
43rd, 1st Sess. 
(1997) 
Hamilton (3rd) 
.204 
(.154) 
Jarrett (30th) 
.034 
(.204) 
Fagin (13th) 
.242 
(.160) 
Soltero (14th) 
-.607 
(.164) 
Shaw (12th) 
.121 
(.171) 
Day (12th) 
-.540 
(.174) 
44th, 1st Sess. 
(1999) 
Maiorana (8th) 
.057 
(.141) 
Weiers (16th) 
.106 
(.165) 
Clark (7th) 
.416 
(.126) 
Jackson (3rd) 
-.567 
(.145) 
Griffin (8th) 
.204 
(.171) 
Bundgaard (19th) 
-.531 
(.113) 
44th, 2nd Sess. 
(2000) 
Cunningham 
(13th) 
-.553 
(.184) 
McGibbon (9th) 
.223 
(.195) 
Valadez (10th) 
.358 
(.145) 
E. Richardson (11th) 
-.551 
(.177) 
Huffman (12th) 
.144 
(.199) 
Bee (9th) 
-.654 
(.205) 
45th, 1st Sess. 
(2001) 
Loredo (22nd) 
-.149 
(.169) 
May (26th) 
-.088 
(.169) 
Foster (20th) 
-.261 
(.146) 
Cummiskey (25th) 
.318 
(.165) 
Nelson (17th) 
-.251 
(.170) 
Gnant (28th) 
.623 
(.128) 
45th, 2nd Sess. 
(2002) 
Avelar (23rd) 
-.053 
(.216) 
Verkamp (2nd) 
.165 
(.222) 
 
Pickens (14th) 
-.333 
(.209) 
Mitchell (27th) 
.190 
(.228) 
Pearce (29th) 
-.157 
(.248) 
 
Petersen (29th) 
.523 
(.246) 
*Note: The ideal point estimates in this table are the means of 1000 bootstrap Trials.  Standard Errors appear in parentheses. These ideal point estimates are not 
comparable across sessions.  However, they are comparable across chambers in a single session.  Where a relevant subset of legislators is an even number, the 
median presented is the ideal point estimate for the senator in position (max – min) / 2.  Legislators are listed with their district immediately following in 
parentheses. 
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Table 3: Intra-District Comparisons of House Members to the Other District Representative and the District Senator  
 
Session 
House 
Comparison 
|H1-H2| 
Average Absolute 
Difference 
House/Senate 
       mean{|S-H|} 
Largest 
House/Senate 
Difference 
max{|S - H1|,|S - 
H2|} 
Mean Standard Error 
of the Estimates 
 
42-1 0.477 0.413 0.590 0.113 
42-2 0.474 0.322 0.461 0.137 
43-1 0.584 0.479 0.641 0.193 
44-1 0.313 0.366 0.477 0.182 
44-2 0.313 0.431 0.545 0.128 
45-1 0.371 0.338 0.432 0.138 
45-2 0.308 0.384 0.525 0.141 
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